152 ideas
| 7490 | Because of Darwin, wisdom as a definite attainable state has faded [Watson] |
| 7461 | The three key ideas are the soul, Europe, and the experiment [Watson] |
| 7464 | The big idea: imitation, the soul, experiments, God, heliocentric universe, evolution? [Watson] |
| 20771 | Six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, theology [Cleanthes, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
| 3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
| 3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
| 3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
| 7465 | Babylonian thinking used analogy, rather than deduction or induction [Watson] |
| 3508 | Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle] |
| 3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
| 7746 | We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle] |
| 7747 | How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle] |
| 7748 | 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle] |
| 7749 | Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle] |
| 7750 | Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle] |
| 3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
| 7466 | Mesopotamian numbers applied to specific things, and then became abstract [Watson] |
| 3473 | Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle] |
| 5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
| 5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
| 3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
| 3532 | Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle] |
| 3533 | Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin] |
| 3454 | Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle] |
| 5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
| 3471 | Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle] |
| 3472 | Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle] |
| 3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
| 3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3490 | Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle] |
| 3491 | Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle] |
| 3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
| 3482 | Perception is a function of expectation [Searle] |
| 3493 | Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle] |
| 3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
| 3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
| 3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
| 3463 | We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle] |
| 3457 | Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle] |
| 3480 | We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle] |
| 5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
| 5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
| 5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
| 5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |
| 3479 | The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle] |
| 3470 | Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle] |
| 3486 | Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle] |
| 3503 | Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle] |
| 3465 | Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle] |
| 3484 | Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle] |
| 3489 | Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle] |
| 3494 | Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle] |
| 3481 | Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle] |
| 5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
| 4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
| 20657 | There are 23 core brain functions, with known circuit, transmitters, genes and behaviour [Watson] |
| 3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
| 3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
| 3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
| 3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
| 3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
| 3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
| 3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
| 3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
| 3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
| 3467 | Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle] |
| 3483 | Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle] |
| 3468 | I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle] |
| 3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
| 3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
| 3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
| 3469 | Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle] |
| 3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
| 6028 | Bodies interact with other bodies, and cuts cause pain, and shame causes blushing, so the soul is a body [Cleanthes, by Nemesius] |
| 3485 | Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle] |
| 3458 | Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle] |
| 3461 | Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle] |
| 2427 | Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers] |
| 7389 | A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle] |
| 7390 | If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle] |
| 3496 | A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle] |
| 5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
| 3499 | Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle] |
| 3501 | If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle] |
| 5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
| 3456 | Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle] |
| 3475 | Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle] |
| 3455 | Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle] |
| 3453 | Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle] |
| 5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
| 3476 | Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle] |
| 3477 | If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle] |
| 3531 | Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle] |
| 3478 | Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle] |
| 3466 | Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle] |
| 5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
| 20656 | Traditional ideas of the mind were weakened in the 1950s by mind-influencing drugs [Watson] |
| 20831 | The soul suffers when the body hurts, creates redness from shame, and pallor from fear [Cleanthes] |
| 3500 | Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle] |
| 9317 | Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford] |
| 3474 | If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle] |
| 5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |
| 3497 | If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle] |
| 3462 | We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle] |
| 3498 | Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle] |
| 3492 | Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle] |
| 3464 | There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle] |
| 3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle] |
| 3451 | Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle] |
| 3450 | Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle] |
| 3507 | Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle] |
| 3495 | Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle] |
| 3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
| 3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
| 3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
| 3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
| 20655 | Humans have been hunter-gatherers for 99.5% of their existence [Watson] |
| 3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
| 3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
| 3505 | The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle] |
| 3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
| 3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
| 7477 | Modern democracy is actually elective oligarchy [Watson] |
| 7478 | Greek philosophers invented the concept of 'nature' as their special subject [Watson] |
| 3504 | Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle] |
| 20650 | The Uncertainty Principle implies that cause and effect can't be measured [Watson] |
| 20649 | The interference of light through two slits confirmed that it is waves [Watson] |
| 20661 | Electrons rotate in hyrogen atoms 10^13 times per second [Watson] |
| 20647 | Quantum theory explains why nature is made up of units, such as elements [Watson] |
| 20654 | Only four particles are needed for matter: up and down quark, electron, electron-neutrino [Watson] |
| 20651 | The shape of molecules is important, as well as the atoms and their bonds [Watson] |
| 20652 | In 1828 the animal substance urea was manufactured from inorganic ingredients [Watson] |
| 20658 | Information is physical, and living can be seen as replicating and preserving information [Watson] |
| 3502 | Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle] |
| 7462 | DNA mutation suggests humans and chimpanzees diverged 6.6 million years ago [Watson] |
| 3459 | You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle] |
| 5993 | The ascending scale of living creatures requires a perfect being [Cleanthes, by Tieleman] |
| 7470 | During the rise of civilizations, the main gods changed from female to male [Watson] |
| 7474 | Hinduism has no founder, or prophet, or creed, or ecclesiastical structure [Watson] |
| 7480 | Monotheism was a uniquely Israelite creation within the Middle East [Watson] |
| 7479 | Modern Judaism became stabilised in 200 CE [Watson] |
| 7481 | The Israelites may have asserted the uniqueness of Yahweh to justify land claims [Watson] |
| 7471 | The Gathas (hymns) of Zoroastrianism date from about 1000 BCE [Watson] |
| 7473 | Zoroaster conceived the afterlife, judgement, heaven and hell, and the devil [Watson] |
| 7483 | Paul's early writings mention few striking episodes from Jesus' life [Watson] |
| 7484 | Jesus never intended to start a new religion [Watson] |
| 7475 | Confucius revered the spiritual world, but not the supernatural, or a personal god, or the afterlife [Watson] |
| 7476 | Taoism aims at freedom from the world, the body, the mind, and nature [Watson] |
| 7463 | The three basic ingredients of religion are: the soul, seers or priests, and ritual [Watson] |
| 7468 | In ancient Athens the souls of the dead are received by the 'upper air' [Watson] |